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Abstract
We analyze a labor market with search and matching frictions where wage setting is
controlled by a monopoly union. Frictions render existing matches a form of firm-
specific capital which is subject to a hold-up problem in a unionized labor market. We
study how this hold-up problem manifests itself in a dynamic infinite horizon model,
with fully rational agents. We find that wage solidarity, seemingly an important norm
governing union operations, leaves the unionized labor market vulnerable to potentially
substantial distortions due to hold-up. Introducing a tenure premium in wages may
allow the union to avoid the problem entirely, however, potentially allowing efficient
hiring. Under an egalitarian wage policy, the degree of commitment to future wages
is important for outcomes: with full commitment to future wages, the union achieves
efficient hiring in the long run, but hikes up wages in the short run to appropriate
rents from firms. Without commitment, and in a Markov-perfect equilibrium, hiring
is well below its efficient level both in the short and the long run. We demonstrate
the quantitative impact of the union in an extended model with partial union coverage
and multi-period union contracting.
JEL classification: E02, E24, J51, J64
Keywords: Labor unions, frictional labor markets, time inconsistency, limited commit-
ment, long-term contracting
1 Introduction
Labor unions play an important role in many labor markets in many countries. There is also a
large literature within labor economics studying how union presence influences labor market
outcomes. Yet there is relatively little work studying the impact of this institution on the
labor market when this market is described as having frictions and featuring unemployment
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due to these frictions. Since search and matching models have come to play a central role as
a workhorse for macroeconomic labor market analyses, this gap in the literature leaves open
important questions. What is the impact of unions on unemployment and wages? How do
unions affect how strongly unemployment varies over the business cycle? What institutional
settings are desirable, when considering implementing rules regarding union coverage?
Our model can be interpreted as representing either the aggregate labor market or an in-
dustry labor market, but in either case we consider the case of a “large” union, which has
monopoly power over some group of workers. This case is of particular relevance for many
European economies, where there is a nationwide union or cooperation/agreements among
unions representing different industries. It is also of relevance in other settings where workers
cannot easily move across industries, and competition among different unions within an in-
dustry is limited. We assume the union to be fully rational, taking job creation into account
when making its wage demands, and its objective to be the welfare of all workers covered by
union wages.
In our model, all workers have the same productivity and fulfil equally productive jobs.
Our starting point is a view that union operations are governed by a norm of solidarity
and egalitarianism among workers, which leads us to the assumption that unions impose
identical wages across these workers. This view can be motivated in part by the broad
empirical evidence documenting that unions compress the distribution of wages. We find
that such fairness comes at a non-trivial cost, however, as it leaves the unionized labor
market vulnerable to a potentially severe hold-up problem, which leads to inefficiently high
wages and low job creation.
Under the egalitarian wage policy, the degree to which the union can commit to future
wages becomes qualitatively and quantitatively important for outcomes.1 If the union is
able to fully commit to future wages, it attains an efficient level of unemployment in the
long run. In the short run, however, unemployment is inefficiently high because the union
uses its market power to raise current wages above the efficient level, in order to extract rents
from firms with pre-existing matches. Specifically, we show that labor market tightness is
inefficiently low in the initial period, but efficient from then on. These elements give rise to
a time inconsistency: if a union had decided on a commitment plan yesterday, but had the
opportunity to revise it today, it would indeed revise it to benefit again from pre-existing
matches.
What would happen if the union did not have commitment to future wages? How large
would the effects on the labor market be? We answer this question by analyzing Markov-
perfect equilibria.2 In a calibrated model, the presence of the union raises wages by 12.5%,
consequently raising unemployment from 5% to 16.5%, and reducing output by 12%, relative
to efficient outcomes. The distortions associated with the union diminish as the duration
1The degree of commitment to wages is important in hold-up problems in general, with full commitment
potentially avoiding the hold-up problem entirely. In the dynamic model with an egalitarian wage policy
the situation is more involved, however, because even in the union problem with full commitment there are
some workers who were hired in the past and whose wages will, in part, be set after they have already been
hired.
2Our focus is on differentiable Markov-perfect equilibria. Thus we do not consider other equilibria where
history matters, such as sustainable plans equilibria (Chari and Kehoe 1990).
2
of union contracts increases, but this effect appears quantitatively weak: the effects remain
very similar as we vary duration from one to three years, viewed as the empirically relevant
range of union contract durations (Taylor 1983).
In a classic paper, Calmfors and Driffill (1988) reconsidered the impact of unions on the
level of aggregate economic activity. It has long been recognized that unions, through their
monopoly power in the labor market, tend to raise wages above their competitive levels, sug-
gesting that a greater union presence in the labor market has a primarily negative impact
on economic activity. Calmfors and Driffill (1988) propose an additional factor for under-
standing the cross-country evidence on unions: they argue that the degree of coordination
in union bargaining works to counteract the negative effects of monopoly power. Our model
generates a related hump-shaped relationship, which we illustrate in the quantitative section,
where we allow for partial union coverage of the workforce. Because union wages tend to be
higher than non-union wages, greater union coverage tends to lead to higher unemployment
in our model as well. But greater union coverage also increases the extent to which the union
takes into account the effects of its wage demands on hiring, borne by union and non-union
workers alike, leading to moderation in union wage setting. As we increase union coverage,
the second effect eventually takes over the first, leading to a hump-shaped relationship.
An important motivation for macroeconomists to think about unions has been the idea that
union wages are less responsive to shocks, potentially helping understand the observed vari-
ability of employment (see, e.g., Blanchard and Fischer 1989). The model we study in the
quantitative section builds in significant stickiness in wages, due to the union recontracting
only every one to three years. We demonstrate the substantial impact this has on shock prop-
agation in the model, with amplification in the responses of vacancy creation, employment,
and output to shocks.
Finally, while we view egalitarianism a characteristic of union operations, we also show
that relaxing the egalitarian wage policy, for example by allowing a tenure premium in
union wages, can provide the union sufficient instruments to avoid the holdup problem, even
entirely. In this case the union extract rents from firms with high wages for senior workers,
while setting the wages of junior workers low enough to nevertheless encourage hiring. Unless
the union runs into a binding constraint on how low the wages of junior workers can be
(possibly negative), efficient hiring attains. The model thus implies a rationale for a tenure
premium in union wages.
Related literature There exists a set of papers developing extensions of the Mortensen-
Pissarides model with a union/unions governing wage determination. Perhaps closest in
spirit to our paper in this group is Pissarides (1986), which first introduces a monopoly
union into the Pissarides (1985) framework, and studies the impact on equilibrium outcomes
in the labor market. As the literature following it, that paper focuses on steady states,
however, side-stepping the dynamic issues we highlight here. The more recent papers are
more applied: Garibaldi and Violante (2005) and Boeri and Burda (2009) study the effects
of employment protection policies, Ebell and Haefke (2006) the effects of product market
regulation, Acikgoz and Kaymak (2014) the evolution of skill premia and unionization rates
over time. These papers generally adopt frameworks imposing exogenous wage compression
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into union wage setting, with the exception of Taschereau-Dumouchel (2011) who develops
a framework where it is endogenous. Delacroix (2006) extends the framework of Ebell and
Haefke (2006) to capture the U-shaped relationship between the degree of coordination in
union bargaining and economic performance postulated by Calmfors and Driffill (1988).3
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 begins with a brief overview of the empirical
evidence on unions. Section 3 analyzes the benchmark model: first a one-period model to
provide intuition, and then an infinite-horizon model with and without commitment. Section
4 turns to a quantitative illustration in the context of an extended model and Section 5
concludes.
2 Evidence on Unions, Wages and Unemployment
Most workers in the OECD, outside the US, have their wages determined by union agree-
ments. This cross country evidence is discussed by Nickell and Layard (1999), who report
that in most European countries the share of workers covered by union wages exceeds 70%.
An important feature of the cross-country evidence to keep in mind is that union coverage
rates – the share of the labor force whose wages are determined by union wage bargaining –
generally exceed union membership rates outside of the US. Even in countries where union
membership rates are low, such as France, within firms many non-union workers are paid
the union wage, and in many countries union wages are legally extended to cover non-union
firms as well.4
In terms of the effects of unions, Nickell and Layard (1999) show that a cross-country re-
gression of unemployment on measures of union membership and coverage reveals a positive
relationship between union presence and unemployment. But there is also significant hetero-
geneity across countries in the degree of centralization and coordination in union bargaining,
as highlighted by Calmfors and Driffill (1988), and it turns out that this positive relationship
between union presence and unemployment can partly be offset by measures of coordination
in bargaining.
Nickell and Layard (1999) also report that union membership is associated with higher wages
on the individual level across countries. A large literature has studied this union/non-union
wage gap, using a variety of data sources and econometric approaches. Lewis (1986) reviews
the literature for the US, concluding that the evidence points to an upper bound of 15%
for the union wage gap. More recently, Blanchflower and Bryson (2003) confirm that the
3Lockwood and Manning (1989) and Modesto and Thomas (2001) have studied union wage-setting in
labor markets where firms face adjustment costs to labor, developing the idea that dynamic concerns become
important for thinking about union decision-making when labor markets are not fully frictionless. The simple
partial equilibrium quadratic adjustment cost framework adopted in these papers affords closed-form results
which speak to the level of union wage demands, as well as the speed of adjustment in firm-level employment.
Our work brings these ideas into an equilibrium framework, which allows thinking about unemployment and
vacancy creation as well.
4Visser (2003) also documents union membership and coverage rates across countries, reporting an average
coverage rate of 73 % across European countries for the period 1985-97. While union membership has been
on the decline in Europe as well as the US, coverage levels remain substantially higher in Europe.
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estimates of the wage gap have remained relatively stable, with perhaps a modest decline over
time. They also report estimates across countries, noting that in many European countries
the extensive coverage of union wages reduces these gaps. An important concern with the
estimates of the union wage gap in general involves selection on unobservables: it is likely
that higher union wages attract better workers, but the data do not allow controlling for
these differences properly, biasing the estimates of the wage gap. When DiNardo and Lee
(2004) adopt a regression discontinuity design to get around some of the issues, they find a
negligible wage gap, seemingly contradicting a large body of evidence.5
A robust finding appears to be that unions reduce wage inequality, compressing the distribu-
tion of wages (Card, Lemieux, and Riddell 2003). Do they compress wages across degrees of
seniority as well? Certainly formal pay scales appear common in union compensation prac-
tices, but arguably wages rise with tenure in non-union settings as well. Perhaps because
unions tend to compress the distribution of wages, a number of earlier studies have actu-
ally reported a stronger association between tenure and earnings in non-union settings. But
properly estimating returns to tenure is challenging and the comparison confounded by the
fact that the estimates tend to be biased by worker and job heterogeneity, generally found
to be greater in non-union than union settings.6 Recognizing these challenges, Abraham
and Farber (1988) find a stronger association between tenure and earnings in the unionized
setting, supporting the idea that seniority plays an important role in union operations. At
the same time, Topel (1991) finds no significant difference in returns to tenure based on
union status. Again, data limitations leave us short of a conclusive answer, but the evidence
in favor of overall wage compression does appear robust.
3 The model
This section begins by describing the simple Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching envi-
ronment we base our analysis on. We then introduce a monopoly union into that framework,
and characterize its behavior.
A frictional labor market Time is discrete and the horizon infinite. The economy is
populated by a continuum of measure one identical workers, together with a continuum of
identical capitalists who employ these workers. All agents have linear utility, and discount
the future at rate β < 1. Capitalists have access to a linear production technology, producing
z units of output per period for each worker employed. In addition to this market production
technology, unemployed workers also have access to a home production technology, producing
b(< z) units of output per period.
The labor market is frictional, requiring capitalists seeking to hire workers to post vacancies.
5Their study focuses on close union election outcomes in the US. Of course it is possible that wage gaps
at workplaces with close election outcomes are smaller than at those with clear cut ones, as well as that
wages at newly unionized workplaces are different from those with an established union presence.
6The magnitude of returns to tenure is a debated topic, see for example Altonji and Williams (2005) and
Buchinsky, Fougre, Kramarz, and Tchernis (2010).
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The measure of matches in the beginning of the period is denoted by n ∈ [0, 1], leaving 1−n
workers searching for jobs. Searching workers and posted vacancies are matched according
to a constant-returns-to-scale matching function m(v, 1 − n), where v is the measure of
vacancies. With this, the probability with which a searching worker finds a job within a
period can be written µ(θ) = m(θ, 1), and the probability with which a vacancy is filled
q(θ) = m(1, 1/θ), where θ = v/(1 − n) is the labor market tightness. We assume that
µ′(θ) is positive and decreasing and q′(θ) negative and increasing. With this, employment
equals n plus the measure of new matches, µ(θ)(1 − n). Jobs are destroyed each period
with probability δ. Thus, the measure of matches evolves over time according to the law of
motion
nt+1 = (1− δ) (nt + µ(θt)(1− nt))︸ ︷︷ ︸
employed
t
. (1)
Firms Capitalists operate production through firms, and these firms need to post vacancies
in order to find workers, at a cost κ per vacancy. Competition drives profits from vacancy
creation to zero, with firms taking into account the union wage-setting behavior today and in
the future. The zero-profit condition thus determines the current market tightness according
to current and future wages {wt+s}∞s=0 as follows:
κ = q(θt)
∞∑
s=0
βs(1− δ)s[z − wt+s
]
. (2)
Union Wages are set unilaterally by a labor union, with universal coverage. The union
sets wages to maximize the welfare of all workers, with equal pay for all those employed.7
The union objective thus becomes
∞∑
t=0
βt
[ (
nt + µ(θt)(1− nt)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
employed
t
wt + (1− nt)(1− µ(θt))︸ ︷︷ ︸
unemployed
t
b
]
. (3)
The union takes as given the evolution of employment according to equation (1). It also
internalizes the effect of its wage-setting decisions on hiring. Therefore, the union’s problem
is to choose a sequence of wages {wt}∞t=0 to maximize the objective (3) subject to the law of
motion (1) and zero profit condition (2). The union must also respect the constraint that
the firms, at each point in time, make a non-negative present value of profits on existing
matches, as they could simply end them otherwise. This is implied by positive vacancy
posting, however, because if firms posting vacancies break even, existing matches must have
strictly positive value.
Summarizing the events in period t, we have
nt given
union sets wt
vacancy posting, vt
vt and 1− nt search
production
separations
7Note that if we normalize b = 0, then the union objective becomes the total wage bill.
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Given the path of wages {wt}∞t=0, then, equation (2) determines the path of market tightness
{θt}∞t=0, which in turn determines the evolution of employment.
3.1 One-period example
To illustrate key forces at play, we first consider the impact of the union in a very simple
setting: a one-period version of the above economy. Many of the features present here will
be present in the subsequent analysis.
Planner A natural starting point is the efficient benchmark—the output-maximizing level
of vacancy creation a social planner would choose. Here the planner solves the problem
max
θ
(
n + µ(θ)(1− n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
employed
)
z + (1− n)(1− µ(θ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
unemployed
b− θ(1− n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
vacancies
κ,
taking as given pre-existing matches n. The planner’s optimum is characterized by the first-
order condition −κ+µ′(θ)(z−b) = 0, which pins down θ independent of n. For concreteness,
consider the matching function m(v, u) = vu/(v+u), such that µ(θ) = θ/(1+θ). In this case
the planner’s optimum is given by θp =
√
(z − b)/κ−1, with market tightness an increasing
function of market productivity. Of course, we must have z − b > κ for vacancy creation to
be optimal.
Union The union instead aims to maximize the welfare of workers(
n+ µ(θ)(1− n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
employed
)
w + (1− n)(1− µ(θ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
unemployed
b,
by choice of w and θ, subject to the zero-profit condition: κ = q(θ)(z−w). The tradeoff the
union faces here is that while higher wages increase the welfare of employed workers, they
also reduce the job finding probability, because of reduced job creation.
To see how this problem relates to the planner’s problem, we can use the zero-profit condition
to solve for the wage, as w = z − κ/q(θ), and substitute into the union objective to yield a
maximization problem in θ only:
max
θ
(
n+ µ(θ)(1− n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
employed
)(
z − κ
q(θ)
)
+ (1− n)(1− µ(θ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
unemployed
b
= max
θ
− nκ
q(θ)︸︷︷︸
capitalists’ share
+
(
n+ µ(θ)(1− n))z + (1− n)(1− µ(θ))b− θ(1− n)κ︸ ︷︷ ︸
planner’s objective
,
also taking as given n.8 From the second line, we see that the union objective differs from
the planner’s objective only by the term − nκ
q(θ)
. To understand how the two objectives relate
8This substitution assumes some vacancy creation is optimal. The union could also opt to simply set
w = z in the original problem, achieving the value b + n(z − b) for the objective (forgoing vacancy costs
entirely). To ensure the solution in the text is optimal, it is necessary to make sure the value of the objective
exceeds this value.
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to each other, recall that while the planner cares about all agents in the economy, the union
only cares about workers. The union objective thus equals the planner’s objective less the
capitalists’ share of total output: the profits on existing matches n(z −w) = nκ
q(θ)
, where the
equality follows from the zero-profit condition.
An interior union optimum is characterized by the first-order condition −κ + κ n
1−n
q′(θ)
q(θ)2
+
µ′(θ)(z−b) = 0, which implies that the union’s choice of θ does depend on n. In our example,
an interior union optimum is given by θ =
√
1− n
√
(z − b)/κ−1. Labor-market tightness is
thus again an increasing function of market productivity, but now decreases in pre-existing
matches. Clearly the union implements the socially optimal level of vacancy creation if
n = 0. But if n > 0, the union has an incentive to raise wages above the efficient level, in
order to appropriate surpluses from firms with existing matches.
Finally, note that a non-egalitarian union would instead solve the problem
max
θ,we,wn
nwe + µ(θ)(1− n)wn + (1− µ(θ))(1− n)b
s.t. q(θ)(z − wn) = κ,
we ≤ z,
where we allow the union to pay different wages to newly hired workers, wn, and workers
in existing matches, we. If we allow we 6= wn, it is immediately optimal to set we = z.
Substituting this into the union objective then yields the planner objective above, along
with the same condition for optimal hiring: −κ + µ′(θ)(z − b) = 0. With this market
tightness, the wage in new matches is then given by wn = z − κ/q(θ), implying a tenure
premium in union wages: wn < we.
This non-egalitarian case demonstrates that the inefficiency in the initial union problem
stems from the constraint to treat workers identically.9 The theory thus implies a rationale
for tenure premia in union wages, which could—in the absence of a binding lower bound on
the wages of junior workers—even allow the union to attain efficient hiring.
Next, we return to the dynamic infinite horizon setting, where the measure of initial matches
is endogenous.
9These distortions arise because search frictions render existing matches a form of firm-specific capital
which is subject to a hold-up problem. As is typically the case, the degree of commitment to wages is
important for the severity of the hold-up problem. In the extreme case, if wages were set after vacancy
creation takes place (rather than before), the union would simply set (both) wages equal to z, with no new
hiring taking place. The timing here allows the union to commit to wages before vacancy creation, however,
making outcomes less severe.
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3.2 Efficient outcomes
To characterize union wage-setting when the time horizon is infinite, we again begin with the
efficient benchmark. The planner now chooses a sequence {θt}∞t=0, with θt ≥ 0, to maximize
∞∑
t=0
βt
[ (
nt + µ(θt)(1− nt)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
employed
t
z + (1− nt)(1− µ(θt))︸ ︷︷ ︸
unemployed
t
b− θt(1− nt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
vacanciest
κ
]
s.t. nt+1 = (1− δ) (nt + µ(θt)(1− nt))︸ ︷︷ ︸
employed
t
,
with n0 given.
For what comes later it will be useful to formulate problems recursively. Thus, we begin by
writing the planner’s problem recursively, and discussing efficient vacancy creation in that
context. The recursive form for the planner’s problem reads
V p(n) = max
θ
(
n+ µ(θ)(1− n))z + (1− n)(1− µ(θ))b− θ(1− n)κ + βV p(N(n, θ)), (4)
where N(n, θ) ≡ (1 − δ)(n + µ(θ)(1 − n)). Notice that the state variable is n, the number
of matches at the beginning of the period, and that the control variable—market tightness
θ—determines n′ according to the law of motion N(n, θ).
The first-order condition, assuming an interior solution, is
κ = µ′(θ)
(
z − b+ β(1− δ)V p′(n′)). (5)
It equalizes the cost of an additional vacancy, κ, to its benefits: an increase in matches
of µ′(θ), with each new worker delivering the flow surplus z − b today, together with a
continuation value reflecting future flow surpluses.
The envelope condition gives the value of an additional beginning-of-period match, as
V p′(n) = (1− µ(θ) + θµ′(θ))(z − b+ β(1− δ)V p′(n′)). (6)
This value takes into account that the increase in initial matches hampers current hiring by
shrinking the pool of searching workers. To see this in the expression, note that the derivative
of the matching function with respect to unemployment, mu(θ, 1), equals µ(θ)− θµ′(θ).
Eliminating the derivative of the value function in (5), we arrive at the Euler equation
κ
µ′(θ)
= z − b+ β(1− δ)(1− µ(θ′) + θ′µ′(θ′)) κ
µ′(θ′)
. (7)
This equation states the efficiency condition for the Mortensen-Pissarides model, solving
a tradeoff between the costs and benefits of creating a new match today. The cost of an
additional match today is κ/µ′(θ): the cost of a vacancy, κ, times the measure of vacancies
required for one match.10 The benefits of an additional match include the flow surplus z− b
10Since a unit increase in vacancies increases market tightness by 1/(1− n) units, and a unit increase in
market tightness yields (1− n)µ′(θ) new matches, one new vacancy creates µ′(θ) new matches.
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today, together with the expected value of the match next period. The expected value takes
into account that the match survives to the next period with probability 1− δ, and that the
increase in matches shrinks the pool of searching workers tomorrow, so that any planned
vacancy creation next period will yield fewer matches, leading to a net increase in matches
of 1− µ(θ′) + θ′µ′(θ′). Finally, the value of a match tomorrow is again given by κ/µ′(θ′).
Note that the planner’s Euler equation does not feature the state variable n explicitly at all, so
a natural guess for the solution is a constant tightness independent of n. It is straightforward
to show that the planner’s value function is linear in n, and the efficient allocation thus
characterized by a constant market tightness θt = θ
p, for all t ≥ 0.
3.3 A union with commitment
Turning to the unionized labor market, consider the problem of the egalitarian union choosing
a sequence of wages {wt}∞t=0 to maximize the objective (3) subject to the law of motion (1)
and zero profit condition (2) holding at each point in time.
In order to relate the union problem to the planner’s problem, we again use the zero profit
conditions to rewrite the union objective. To this end, note that the union’s choice of a
sequence of wages determines, at each instant, the expected present value of union wages
paid out over the course of an employment relationship: Wt =
∑
∞
s=0 β
s(1 − δ)swt+s. The
sequence {Wt}∞t=0 further pins down the sequence {θt}∞t=0 through the zero-profit conditions,
assuming some vacancy creation occurs each period. Conversely, given a sequence {θt}∞t=0,
one can back out per-period wages by first using the zero-profit condition to find Wt each
period, and then computing wages as wt = Wt − β(1− δ)Wt+1.
Using the zero-profit condition to eliminate wages, the union objective (3) can be written
as:
− n0κ
q(θ0)
+
∞∑
t=0
βt[
(
nt + µ(θt)(1− nt)
)
z + (1− nt)(1− µ(θt))b− θt(1− nt)κ], (8)
revealing an identical objective to that of the planner except for the first term.11 This term—
familiar from the one-period example—reflects the share of the present discounted value of
output accruing to capitalists. To see this, note that the capitalists’ share, i.e., the present
value of profits to firms, can be written as
n0
∞∑
t=0
βt(1− δ)t[z − wt] +
∞∑
t=0
βt[µ(θt)(1− nt)
∞∑
s=0
βs(1− δ)s[z − wt+s]− θt(1− nt)κ]. (9)
Here the first term captures the present value of profits on existing matches, and the second
those on new vacancies created in periods t = 0, 1, . . .. The expression reduces to representing
initial matches only, however, as free entry drives the present value of profits to new vacancies
to zero.12 Pre-existing matches, on the other hand, are due a strictly positive present value
11See Appendix A.
12We can write the second term in equation (9) as
∑
∞
t=0
βt(1−nt)θt[q(θt)
∑
∞
s=0
βs(1− δ)s[z−wt+s]− κ],
which equals zero due to the free entry condition (2).
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of profits, because these firms paid the vacancy cost in the past, anticipating positive profits
in the future to make up for it. Using the zero-profit condition, this remaining present value
can be expressed as n0κ/q(θ0).
The union objective (8) reflects the fact that while the planner maximizes the present dis-
counted value of output, the union only cares about the workers’ share of it. As a result,
the union will have an incentive to appropriate some of this present value from capitalists
by raising wages above the efficient level—and this is exactly how the solutions to the two
problems will differ.
Proposition 1. If the union is able to commit to future wages, hiring is efficient after the
initial period. In the initial period, hiring is efficient if n0 = 0 and below efficient if n0 > 0.
Note that after the initial period, the union effectively solves the planner’s problem (4), and
consequently chooses the planner’s solution θt = θ
p ∀t ≥ 1. In the initial period, however,
the union chooses θ0 to maximize
− n0κ
q(θ0)
+
(
n0 + µ(θ0)(1− n0)
)
z + (1− n0)
(
1− µ(θ0)
)
b− θ0(1− n0)κ+ βV p
(
N(n0, θ0)
)
,
(10)
where n0 is given, and V
p solves the planner’s problem (4).13
Deriving the optimality condition for this initial period is straightforward using the same
methods as above. It becomes
[1− n0
1− n0
q′(θ0)
q(θ0)2
]
κ
µ′(θ0)
= z − b+ β(1− δ)(1− µ(θp) + θpµ′(θp)) κ
µ′(θp)
, (11)
where we have used the fact that in subsequent periods we will have the efficient market
tightness θp. Comparing to the efficiency condition (7), the cost of creating an additional
match today (on the left) is higher for the union than for the planner. This occurs because in
order to increase hiring, the union must lower wages, giving up some of the surplus it could
have appropriated from firms with existing matches. Moreover, the more existing matches
there are, the greater this additional cost.
Using the efficiency condition (7), we can further rewrite equation (11) as
[1− n0
1− n0
q′(θ0)
q(θ0)2
]
1
µ′(θ0)
=
1
µ′(θp)
.
Because q′(θ) < 0 and µ′(θ) is decreasing, this equation implies that the market tightness
will generally be lower in the initial period than the efficient value it takes on after that,
and the more initial matches, the lower its initial value. Thus, as in the one-period example,
the initial market tightness depends negatively on the measure of existing matches. This is
13Again, using the zero-profit condition to substitute out wages assumes positive vacancy creation each
period. The union could, as an alternative, also choose to set the initial present value of wages so high as to
shut down hiring in the first period entirely, allowing matches to depreciate. This becomes more attractive
when initial matches are plentiful.
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a key feature of the model, which becomes even more important when the union does not
have commitment.
That the outcome in the initial period differs from later periods reflects a time inconsistency
issue in the union wage-setting problem. If the union were to re-optimize after the initial
period, it would face a different objective and choose a different path of wages. While
the union can thus get relatively close to the efficient outcome when it can commit, this
immediate time inconsistency begs the question: what happens if the union cannot commit
to future actions? To study time-consistent union decision making we next turn to a game-
theoretic setting, which will be based on the recursive formulation of the union problem we
set up above.
3.4 A union without commitment
The union problem (10) suggests that if the union were to re-optimize at any date, its choice
of initial θ would depend on n, the measure of matches in the beginning of the period. In
particular, a higher n should imply a lower θ. How would outcomes change if the union could
not commit to not re-optimizing? We study this question by focusing on (differentiable)
Markov-perfect equilibria with n as a state variable. That n is a payoff- and action-relevant
state variable should be clear from the problem under commitment.14 In a Markov-perfect
equilibrium, the union anticipates its future choices of θ to depend (negatively) on n, a
relationship we label Θ(n). Our task, then, is to characterize Θ(n).
The function Θ(n) solves a problem similar to (10), namely
Θ(n) ≡ argmax
θ
− nκ
q(θ)
+
(
n+ µ(θ)(1− n))z + (1− n)(1− µ(θ))b− θ(1− n)κ + βV (N(n, θ)),
(12)
where the continuation value V satisfies the recursive equation
V (n) =
(
n+ µ(Θ(n))(1− n))z + (1− n)(1− µ(Θ(n)))b−Θ(n)(1− n)κ+ βV (N(n,Θ(n))).
(13)
Here, the union recognizes that its future actions will follow Θ(n), and this is reflected in the
continuation value V (n). Because Θ(n) will generally not be efficient, V (n) will not equal
V p(n), the continuation value under commitment.
AMarkov-perfect equilibrium is defined as a pair of functions Θ(n) and V (n) solving (12)–(13)
for all n. We will assume that these functions are differentiable and characterize equilibria
based on this assumption.
From equation (12), the first-order condition for market tightness becomes
[1− n
1− n
q′(θ)
q(θ)2
]κ = µ′(θ)
(
z − b+ β(1− δ)V ′(n′)), (14)
14One can add states, representing histories of past behavior, but we do not consider such equilibria here.
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and the equation paralleling the envelope condition—now not formally an envelope condition
since the union does not agree with its future decisions—becomes
V ′(n) =(1− µ(θ) + θµ′(θ))(z − b+ β(1− δ)V ′(n′))
+ µ′(θ)
(
Θ′(n)(1− n)− θ)(− n
1− n
q′(θ)
q(θ)2
κ
µ′(θ)
)
. (15)
Equation (15) is derived by differentiating equation (13) and using equation (14) to arrive at
a formulation close to the equivalent condition (6) for the planner. Compared to the planner’s
envelope condition, this equation includes some additional terms, which appear because the
envelope theorem does not hold. These terms work to reduce the value of additional initial
matches n, as the union sets the market tightness too low—following Θ(n)—and to an extent
that increases in n.
We can further combine the above two equations to eliminate V ′, obtaining
[1− n
1− n
q′(θ)
q(θ)2
]
κ
µ′(θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost of match today
= z − b+ β(1− δ)[(1− µ(θ′) + θ′µ′(θ′)) [1− n
′
1− n′
q′(θ′)
q(θ′)2
]
κ
µ′(θ′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
value of match tomorrow
+ µ′(θ′)(Θ′(n′)(1− n′)− θ′)(− n
′
1− n′
q′(θ′)
q(θ′)2
)
κ
µ′(θ′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
loss in value from lack of commitment
],
(16)
which is a generalized Euler equation. It is a functional equation in the unknown policy
function Θ, where the derivative of Θ appears. The equation is written in a short-hand way:
θ is short for Θ(n), θ′ is short for Θ(N(n,Θ(n))), and n′ is short for N(n,Θ(n)). The task is
to find a function Θ that solves this equation for all n. Note that in contrast to the planner’s
Euler equation, n appears non-trivially in this equation and will generally matter for the
tightness—it is easily verified that a constant Θ will not solve the equation.
Equation (16), like the planner’s Euler equation (7), represents the tradeoff between the
costs and benefits of creating matches today. The cost of an additional match for the union
exceeds the cost for the planner, however, because in addition to the increase in vacancy
costs κ/µ′(θ), the union also takes into account that increasing hiring requires reducing wages,
thereby giving up some of the surplus it could have appropriated from firms, captured by
the term: − n
1−n
q′(θ)
q(θ)2
κ
µ′(θ)
. This additional cost appears also in the Euler equation (11) for
the union with commitment, but here it appears both today and tomorrow symmetrically,
unlike in the commitment solution where tomorrow’s union simply carries out today’s plan.
Beyond this difference, the union also takes into account its inability to commit to future
wages: creating more matches today will reduce hiring tomorrow, as tomorrow’s union will
raise wages to exploit those matches. A marginal increase in matches reduces hiring by
µ′(θ)(Θ′(n)(1− n)−Θ(n)), with each lost worker valued at the size of the distortion in the
union objective—the marginal surplus appropriated from capitalists.15
15To see this, note that the measure of vacancies can be written as Θ(n)(1 − n) and its derivative with
respect to initial matches n as Θ′(n)(1 − n)−Θ(n).
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Note that equation (16) differs from standard Euler equations in that the derivative of the
function Θ appears in the equation. This means that even solving for a steady state will
be more complicated than usual, requiring information about the shape of the Θ function.
By a steady state we mean a level of initial matches n and corresponding market tightness
θ = Θ(n) such that the law of motion maintains the same level of matches: N(n,Θ(n)) = n.
In this case we cannot simply use equation (16) together with the law of motion to solve for
a steady state (n, θ)-pair, because the derivative appears as an additional unknown.
It is hard to establish theoretically that Θ(n) is indeed decreasing. In the one-period example
of Section 3.1 we saw that Θ becomes a decreasing function of n, and in our numerically
solved examples below this also holds. What is possible to show for the infinite-horizon case,
however, is that whenever Θ(n) is decreasing, steady-state market tightness is strictly below
its efficient level.
Proposition 2. If Θ(n) is decreasing in n, then the steady-state market tightness, θ, in the
unionized labor market (without commitment) is strictly below its efficient level.
It follows that steady-state unemployment in the unionized labor market is strictly above its
efficient level.
3.5 A non-egalitarian union
If we relax the equal pay constraint by allowing the union to pay different wages to newly
hired workers (wnt ) and workers in existing matches (w
e
t ), then the union objective becomes
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
ntw
e
t + µ(θt)(1− nt)wnt + (1− nt)(1− µ(θt))b
]
, (17)
and the zero profit condition
κ = q(θt)
[
z − wnt +
∞∑
s=1
βs(1− δ)s(z − wet+s)
]
. (18)
In this case we must also impose a separate condition ensuring firms make a non-negative
present value of profits on existing workers:
∞∑
s=0
βs(1− δ)s(z − wet+s) ≥ 0, ∀t ≥ 0. (19)
The non-egalitarian union chooses two sequences of wages, {wnt }∞t=0 and {wet}∞t=0, to maximize
the objective (17) subject to the law of motion (1), zero profit conditions (18), and constraints
(19) holding at each point in time.
In setting the wages of existing workers, the best the union can do is to set wet = z each
period, leaving firms with zero surplus on existing matches. From the zero profit condition
then, we have that wnt = z−κ/q(θt), ∀t ≥ 0. Using this expression to substitute out wages in
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the union objective, it is easy to see that the union problem becomes identical to the planner
problem, thus leading to efficient hiring: θt = θ
p, ∀t ≥ 0. The solution therefore involves a
constant and efficient market tightness over time, as well as constant wages which exhibit a
tenure premium: wnt = z − κ/q(θp) and wet = z ∀t ≥ 0.
We thus conclude that in the infinite horizon setting as well, the union may be able to attain
efficient hiring through a wage tenure premium. A potential concern is that the implied
wages of new workers may be quite low—they need to be low enough to allow firms to make
the entire present value of profits associated with efficient hiring in the first period of the
match. In the presence of a binding lower bound on the wages of junior workers, the union
wage policy will still involve a tenure premium, but the market tightness will be distorted
down.
In sum, wage solidarity comes at a cost in this economy, suggesting a role for tenure pre-
mia in union wages as a means to avoid the resulting distortions in hiring. And yet, the
empirical evidence does not point to clearly greater returns to tenure in unionized settings
than otherwise. Is this simply due to the measurement problems involved in the empirical
work? Or are the distortions perhaps too insignificant in magnitude to warrant giving up
(the benefits underlying) wage solidarity? To shed light on this question, the next section
turns to a quantitative illustration looking at the impact of the egalitarian union on labor
market outcomes.
4 Quantitative illustration
The presence of an egalitarian union affects the levels and dynamics of wages, unemployment,
and output in the economy. In this section we illustrate these effects, in the context of an
extended model.
4.1 Extended model
For added realism, we first lay out an extended model which incorporates partial unionization
of the labor market, and multi-period union contracting. To this end, we assume that: i) a
fraction α of workers are covered by union wages, with a worker’s union status fixed over time,
while the rest bargain their wages individually, and ii) instead of the union recontracting
each period, it recontracts in any given period with probability λ, implying that contracts
are expected to last 1/λ periods.16
For the non-union workers in the labor market, we can write standard Bellman equations,
which can then be used to derive the following equation for the match surplus:
St = z − b+ β(1− δ)(1− µ(θt+1)γ)St+1. (20)
16We assume search is undirected, an assumption that plays a key role for the discussion in Section 4.4.
If search were fully directed based on union status, the market would separate into two independent parts:
one that follows the full unionization model and one following the standard Mortensen-Pissarides model.
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The equation uses the fact that non-union workers bargain their wages individually, such
that the bargaining outcome divides the match surplus according to the workers’ bargaining
power γ: workers get γSt and firms (1−γ)St.17 Note that the surplus equation (20) depends
on the union’s actions only through the market tightness.
The firms’ zero profit condition can then be written, to reflect the presence of both union
and non-union workers in the labor market, as
κ = q(θt)[α(
z
1− β(1− δ) −Wt) + (1− α)(1− γ)St]. (21)
As the right hand side states, firms expect a present value of profit of (1− γ)St on the 1−α
non-union workers, and a present value of profit of z/(1 − β(1 − δ)) −Wt on the α union
workers. The latter hinges on the expected present value of union wages paid out over the
course of an employment relationship: Wt =
∑
∞
s=0 β
s(1− δ)swt+s.
Turning then to thinking about how union wages {wt}∞t=0 are determined, we return to the
union objective in equation (3). As before, we can rewrite this objective using the zero-profit
condition (21), arriving at the expression
∞∑
t=0
βt[(nt + µ(θt)(1− nt))z + (1− µ(θt))(1− nt)b− θt(1− nt)κ
α
+
1− α
α
(1− γ)µ(θt)(1− nt)St]
− n0κ
αq(θ0)
+
1− α
α
(1− γ)n0S0. (22)
Comparing this expression to the corresponding expression (8) earlier, note that with partial
unionization, the non-union surpluses enter into the union objective because of their impact
on vacancy creation.
Next, we would like to implement multi-period contracting in this setting, aiming for a
recursive representation we could use to solve the model, as before. Note that as far as union
wages are concerned, the object of interest for both the union and the firms is the expected
present value of wages paid out over the course of an employment relationship, Wt. This
present value determines the profitability of hiring union workers, governing vacancy creation
through equation (21). In this sense, the allocative measure of wages here is Wt. What we
would like to do, then, is to specify that in periods when the union does not recontract, Wt
is held fixed, while in periods when the union does recontract, Wt is re-optimized. With
full unionization this would imply that in periods when the union does not recontract, θt
remains fixed, while in periods when the union does recontract, θt adjusts (due to equation
(21)). With partial unionization, this need not hold exactly, because of the presence of the
non-union surpluses in the zero profit condition. However, it turns out to be clearly simpler
to solve the partial union model under the specification that what the union holds fixed in
non-recontracting periods is θt directly.
18 This also appears a reasonable approximation to
17See Appendix B for a derivation.
18Solving the partial union model with Wt held fixed leads to systems of non-linear equations for the non-
union surpluses and their derivatives, while the current specification instead yields linear equations allowing
analytical solutions, which is attractive from the point of view of minimizing error associated with numerical
complexity.
16
holding Wt fixed, in the sense that changes in Wt during non-recontracting periods appear
minor compared to the adjustments upon recontracting. With these concerns in mind, we
proceed under the specification that what is held fixed in periods when the union does not
recontract, is θt.
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To arrive at a recursive representation characterising labor market outcomes, then, we first
write down recursive versions of the equations for the non-union surpluses. Based on equation
(20), for periods when the union recontracts, we have:
Sr(n) = z − b+ β(1− δ)[λ(1− µ(Θ(N(n,Θ(n))))γ)Sr(N(n,Θ(n)))
+ (1− λ)(1− µ(Θ(n))γ)Sf(N(n,Θ(n)),Θ(n))], (23)
and for periods when the union does not recontract, we have:
Sf(n, θ) = z − b+ β(1− δ)[λ(1− µ(Θ(N(n, θ)))γ)Sr(N(n, θ))
+ (1− λ)(1− µ(θ)γ)Sf(N(n, θ), θ)]. (24)
Note that in periods when the union does not recontract, the market tightness is held fixed,
while in periods when the union does recontract, the tightness is determined via the equi-
librium function Θ(n). Union decision-making in recontracting periods then determines the
function Θ(n) as the solution to the problem:
Θ(n) ≡ argmax
θ
(n+ µ(θ)(1− n))z + (1− µ(θ))(1− n)b− θ(1− n)κ
α
− nκ
αq(θ)
+
1− α
α
(1− γ)(n+ µ(θ)(1− n))Sr(n) + βλV r(N(n, θ))+ β(1− λ)V f(N(n, θ), θ),
(25)
where the union value satisfies
V r(n) = (n+ µ(Θ(n))(1− n))z + (1− µ(Θ(n)))(1− n)b−Θ(n)(1− n)κ
α
+
1− α
α
(1− γ)µ(Θ(n))(1− n)Sr(n) + βλV r(N(n,Θ(n)))+ β(1− λ)V f(N(n,Θ(n)),Θ(n))
(26)
in recontracting periods, and
V f(n, θ) = (n + µ(θ)(1− n))z + (1− µ(θ))(1− n)b− θ(1− n)κ
α
+
1− α
α
(1− γ)µ(θ)(1− n)Sf(n, θ) + βλV r(N(n, θ))+ β(1− λ)V f(N(n, θ), θ)
(27)
in non-recontracting periods. These equations follow from the union objective (22) as before.
Next, we move on to calibrating and illustrating the impact of unions in the context of this
model. The focus will, for the most part, be on steady states: a level of initial matches n
and a corresponding tightness θ = Θ(n), such that N(n, θ) = n. With this level of initial
matches, if the union recontracts today it will keep the market tightness unchanged, leading
to the same level of initial matches next period.
19This distinction matters only for Section 4.4, which allows partial union coverage.
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4.2 Calibration and solution approach
We parameterize the model such that the efficient outcome corresponds to the US labor
market, and study how introducing the union changes outcomes in this market.20 The period
length is set to one month, and the discount rate to correspond to a 5 percent annual rate of
return, with β = 1.05−12. We normalize labor productivity to z = 1 and set b = 0.4.21 We
adopt the matching function m(v, u) = µ0vu/(v + u), as in den Haan, Ramey, and Watson
(2000). We pin down the remaining parameters: δ, κ, and µ0, as follows. First, attaining an
average duration of employment of 2.5 years requires a separation rate of δ = 0.033. Second,
to also be consistent with a steady-state unemployment rate of 5 percent, the average job-
finding rate must be µ(θ) = 0.388. Finally, to also match the slope of the Beveridge curve,
documented by Shimer (2007) to equal −1, this requires setting µ0 = 0.652 and a steady-state
value of θ = 1.47. The latter can be achieved by setting κ = 0.109.
The basic Mortensen-Pissarides model is straightforward to solve, as is the planner problem
discussed. The union problem without commitment is clearly more challenging, however.
Issues to bear in mind include that there are few results on the existence of equilibrium for
differentiable Markov-perfect equilibria, that these equilibria may not be unique, and that
non-differentiable equilibria may exist as well.22 In solving for a differentiable equilibrium, a
natural starting point would be the generalized Euler equation of the problem. In our case,
the complexity of the system (23)-(27) does not allow deriving such an equation explicitly, but
it turns out that we can proceed along the same lines also without this formal step. The focus
will be on steady states and to solve for them we adopt the approach of Krusell, Kuruscu, and
Smith (2002), which looks for a Taylor expansion approximation to the unknown function
Θ(n) around the steady state. The approach involves solving successively larger systems
of equations based on the first order condition (and successive derivatives of the first order
condition) of problem (25), looking for convergence in the coefficients of the polynomial as
the order increases. A description of how we implement this approach here can be found in
Appendix C. The next sections describe the results.
4.3 Level effects
We begin by looking at the impact that introducing the union has on the levels of wages,
unemployment and output, relative to the efficient outcome, in the case of full coverage.
According to the theory, the duration of union contracts should play a role in determining
how large the distortions associated with the union are. Available evidence seems to point
20The parametrization strategy follows that in Shimer (2005), aside from adopting a matching function
which is better suited for a discrete time model. He calibrates a decentralized labor market to the US labor
market, but the calibration strategy implies that the equilibrium outcome coincides with the socially optimal
one.
21The results do not change substantially if we raise this to b = 0.75.
22For examples where no differentiable equilibria exist but a non-differentiable equilibrium does, see
Krusell, Martin, and Rios-Rull (2010), and for examples with a continuum of non-differentiable equilib-
ria along with one or more differentiable ones, see Krusell and Smith (2003). Phelps and Pollak (1968) focus
on differentiable equilibria and find multiplicity as well.
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to one to three years as the relevant range of union contract durations, so we begin by
setting λ = 1/24, implying an expected duration of union contracts of two years.23 With
this contract duration, introducing the union into the labor market raises wages by 12.5%,
leading to an increase in unemployment from 5% to 16.5%, and a reduction in output of 12%,
relative to efficient outcomes. As expected, wages and unemployment thus rise, leading to
lower output, but the calculation reveals the quantitative impact to be substantial as well.
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Figure 1: Level effect of union
Notes: The figure plots steady-state wages, unemployment, and output, as a function of the expected
duration of a union contract 1/λ.
To see how the union impact depends on contract duration, Figure 1 plots the steady-state
levels of wages, unemployment and output as a function of the expected duration, 1/λ. The
benchmark in the figure—the efficient outcome—is naturally independent of λ. The figure
shows that the impact of the union diminishes as contract duration increases, as we would
expect. But the figure also reveals that for the relevant range of contract durations this
effect turns out to be rather weak. Even though there is a visible decrease in unemployment
as contract duration increases from one to three years, the magnitude of this decrease is
overshadowed by the overall level effect associated with the union.24
Finally, recall that the decentralized outcome in the Mortensen-Pissarides model is efficient
only if the private bargaining power of workers coincides with that implementing efficient
allocations (Hosios 1990). The value of the bargaining power parameter is difficult to infer
from available data, however, so even though many researchers have chosen to calibrate it
to guarantee efficient allocations, we do not have a good sense of the correct value of this
23For example for the US, Taylor (1983) considers one to three years as the relevant range of union
contracts, Card (1990) documents an average contract duration of 26 months, and Rich and Tracy (2004)
a median duration of 36 months. Fregert and Jonung (2006) document similar durations for Sweden, and
Avouyi-Dovi, Fougere, and Gautier (2013) an average duration of just under a year for France.
24Note that there is no reason to expect the union outcome to converge to the efficient one as the duration
of contracts approaches infinity: Recall that in the commitment union problem analyzed in Section 3.3, the
union distorts θ down in the initial period but attains the efficient θ thereafter. This multi-period contracting
specification, on the other hand, constrains θ to remain fixed between recontracting periods. Thus, it would
seem natural for the union to set this fixed tightness above the efficient level when recontracting.
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parameter. And if the private bargaining power turns out to be high relative to that im-
plementing efficient allocations, unemployment will be above efficient also in a decentralized
market without a union. We return to this issue in the next section, which turns to the case
of partial union coverage.
4.4 Union coverage
In a classic paper, Calmfors and Driffill (1988) reconsider the impact of unions on the level
of economic activity. It has long been recognized that unions, through their monopoly power
in the labor market, tend to raise wages above their competitive levels. This suggests that
a greater union presence in the labor market has a primarily negative impact on economic
activity, as high union wages lead to higher unemployment. Calmfors and Driffill (1988)
propose an additional factor for understanding the cross-country evidence on unions: they
argue that the degree of coordination in union bargaining works to counteract the negative
effects of monopoly power. A related hump-shaped relationship emerges in our model as
well, as we vary the coverage of union wages across the work force.
Two competing forces come to play in the model as we vary union coverage: First of all,
because union wages tend to be higher than non-union wages, greater union coverage tends
to lead to higher unemployment in our model as well. But at the same time, limiting union
coverage also introduces an additional distortion into the model, as the union no longer fully
internalizes the effects of its wage demands on hiring, borne by union and non-union workers
alike. Greater union coverage increases the extent to which the union takes into account
the effects of its wage demands on hiring, leading to moderation in union wage setting. As
we increase union coverage, the second effect eventually takes over the first, leading to a
hump-shaped relationship between coverage and unemployment.
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Figure 2: Role of unionization rate when non-union workers are strong bargainers
Notes: The figure plots union and non-union wages, the average wage, and unemployment as a function of
union coverage α. The non-union bargaining power is set to γ = 0.8.
While intermediate coverage levels come with increased unemployment, which of the two
extremes is better than the other depends on the bargaining power of non-union workers in
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their private wage bargains. To illustrate, consider first a case where non-union workers are
strong bargainers, setting γ = 0.8. Figure 2 plots the steady-state levels of wages and unem-
ployment in this case. The panel on the left first shows how union and non-union wages vary
with union coverage. As union coverage falls, union wages rise until they equal productivity,
and cannot rise further.25 In the meantime the wages of non-union workers remain mostly
unaffected, although reflect changes in the outside options of these workers, which are worse
at intermediate levels of coverage. What enters into firm profits is the weighted average of
these wages across the pool of unemployed, shown in the middle panel. Averaging across
union and non-union workers yields a hump-shaped relationship between union coverage and
the average wage, which further gives rise to the hump-shaped relationship between union
coverage and unemployment shown on the right.
Note that unemployment well exceeds the efficient level of 5% here even without the union,
due to the high private bargaining power of workers, and that introducing the union can
actually improve outcomes over that alternative, if the coverage is high enough. We could
also ask what level of union coverage would be expected to emerge if workers got to choose (in
the beginning of time) whether to be union or non-union. From the figure, it would appear
there exists an interior union coverage level where workers would be indifferent between
being union vs. non-union, in terms of the wages being equal. At that coverage level,
unemployment is lower than it would be if unions were outlawed completely, but higher than
with universal coverage of union wages.
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Figure 3: Role of unionization rate
Notes: The figure plots union and non-union wages, the average wage, and unemployment as a function of
union coverage α. The non-union bargaining power is set to γ = 0.6.
To see how the picture changes when workers are weaker bargainers, Figure 3 looks at the
case where the worker bargaining power yields efficient outcomes (here γ = 0.6). The figure
is qualitatively similar, but in this case unemployment is always higher in the unionized
labor market than it would be without the union. Union wages also always exceed non-
union wages, and by a clear margin. Given a choice, all workers would prefer to be in the
union, but it would be welfare improving to outlaw the union instead.
25Wages cannot rise further or the firms would shut down.
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4.5 Shock propagation
An important reason macroeconomists have been interested in labor unions is the notion
that unions create rigidity in wages, affecting how the economy responds to shocks (Taylor
1980, Blanchard and Fischer 1989). We now turn to illustrating the union impact on shock
propagation in our model, in the context of full unionization.
We consider the effects of a one-time, unanticipated, permanent increase in labor productiv-
ity. We first solve for the steady state before the shock, and then look at how the transition
to higher productivity plays out when the expected duration of wage contracts is two years.26
Figure 4 plots the responses, comparing the unionized labor market (solid line) to the effi-
cient (dashed line), as well as fully fixed wages (dotted line). In the efficient response, the
wage and market tightness adjust immediately to their new steady-state levels. With fixed
wages, the market tightness also adjusts immediately to its new steady-state level, although
in this case larger than what is efficient. The union response lies between these two extremes,
but also differs in exhibiting significant inertia due to the multi-period union contracting.27
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Figure 4: Impulse responses
Notes: The figure plots the responses of the present value of wages, market tightness, unemployment,
vacancies, employment and output to a one percent unanticipated permanent increase in productivity. The
figure shows the response for the economy with full coverage of union wages with two year contracts, the
efficient response, and the response with fully fixed wages. What is plotted are expected values in each
period after the increase in productivity, across possible realizations of the recontracting shock.
In terms of the magnitudes of these responses, the efficient response reflects a sizable on-
26Recall that, with full unionization, our solution approach holds Wt fixed in non-recontracting periods.
The solution to system (23)-(27) gives us a steady-state function Θ(n), which can be used to solve for a
corresponding function W (n) = z/(1 − β(1 − δ)) − κ/q(Θ(n)), characterising the value W will take when
the union recontracts. When the shock hits, we can use the old values of W,n together with the post shock
function W (n) to solve for the evolution of wages.
27Taylor (1980) has highlighted the role of unions in generating persistence in aggregate dynamics due to
long-term contracts.
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impact response of the wage to the shock, which leads to small responses in quantities. This
is the unemployment volatility puzzle discussed by Shimer (2005): the magnitude of these
responses is an order of magnitude lower than what would be needed to be consistent with
business cycle fluctuations in the data. If wages are fixed in response to the shock, quantities
respond substantially more strongly, as highlighted by Hall (2005), allowing the model to
match the magnitude of fluctuations observed. The stickiness in union wages, with two-
year contracting, increases the volatility of quantities substantially relative to the efficient
responses.
Underlying the stickiness in wages due to multi-period contracting, there is also an addi-
tional mechanism generating endogenous real wage rigidity in the model: Wages rise with
some delay because the union distortion is weaker in the immediate aftermath of the shock
when initial matches are relatively low. Wages rise to their full post-shock values only as
matches accumulate to reflect the new, higher productivity. In the figure, the impact of this
endogenous rigidity is overwhelmed by that of the stickiness associated with multi-period
contracting, however.
5 Conclusions
This paper highlights a holdup problem that emerges when an egalitarian union sets wages
in a frictional labor market. After demonstrating the issue in a theoretical setting, we study
the severity of the holdup problem quantitatively in an extended model with partial union-
ization and long-term union contracting. We show that it raises wages and unemployment
significantly above their efficient levels. The relationship between union coverage and un-
employment is hump-shaped in the model, with intermediate levels of coverage featuring
higher unemployment than either very low or very high coverage, and the bargaining power
of non-union workers playing a key role in determining which of the two extremes is closer
to efficient allocations. Long-term union contracts generate significant stickiness in the re-
sponse of wages to shocks. Finally, the theory implies a rationale for tenure premia in union
wages, as a means of avoiding the distortions associated with holdup.
The analysis is conducted in a stylized setting, to isolate key forces at play, but many exten-
sions would seem natural, such as incorporating market power/decreasing returns, physical
capital, worker heterogeneity, an insider-outsider wedge, as well as thinking more about the
decisions of workers to join vs. leave the union in a dynamic setting.
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A Proofs
Proof of relationship between union and planner objectives For the benchmark
model with egalitarian wages, we need to show that
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
nt + ht
)
wt =
∞∑
t=0
βt[
(
nt + ht
)
z − θt(1− nt)κ]− n0κ
q(θ0)
, (28)
where ht stands for newly hired workers, i.e., ht = µ(θt)(1− nt).
First, note that the law of motion for employment implies that nt = (1− δ)tn0 +
∑t−1
k=0(1−
δ)t−khk, so we can write nt + ht = (1 − δ)tn0 +
∑t
k=0(1 − δ)t−khk. Using this identity, the
left hand side of equation (28) can then be written as
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
nt + ht
)
wt = n0
∞∑
t=0
βt(1− δ)twt +
∞∑
t=0
βt
t∑
k=0
(1− δ)t−khkwt. (29)
The first term on the right of equation (29) can be written, using the zero-profit condition,
as
− n0κ
q(θ0)
+ n0
∞∑
t=0
βt(1− δ)tz.
The second term can be written, rearranging and using the zero-profit condition, as
∞∑
t=0
βt
t∑
k=0
(1− δ)t−khkwt =
∞∑
k=0
βkhk
∞∑
t=k
βt−k(1− δ)t−kwt
= −
∞∑
k=0
βkhk
κ
q(θk)
+
∞∑
k=0
βkhk
∞∑
t=k
βt−k(1− δ)t−kz
= −
∞∑
t=0
βtht
κ
q(θt)
+
∞∑
t=0
βt
t∑
k=0
(1− δ)t−khkz.
These two terms combine into
∞∑
t=0
βt[(nt + ht)z − θt(1− nt)κ]− n0κ
q(θ0)
i.e., the right hand side of equation (28). To see this, note that ht/q(θt) = θt(1− nt), and
n0
∞∑
t=0
βt(1− δ)tz +
∞∑
t=0
βt
t∑
k=0
(1− δ)t−khkz =
∞∑
t=0
βt(nt + ht)z.
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With partial unionization, the zero-profit condition changes, affecting this derivation. The
zero-profit condition now implies that the present value of wages Wt satisfy
Wt =
∞∑
k=0
βk(1− δ)kz − κ
αq(θt)
+
1− α
α
(1− γ)St.
Using this new zero-profit condition, the first and second terms on the right of equation (29)
can be written, respectively, as
− n0κ
αq(θ0)
+ n0
∞∑
t=0
βt(1− δ)tz + n0 1− α
α
(1− γ)S0,
and
−
∞∑
t=0
βtht
κ
αq(θt)
+
∞∑
t=0
βt
t∑
k=0
(1− δ)t−khkz + 1− α
α
(1− γ)
∞∑
t=0
βthtSt.
These terms now combine into
∞∑
t=0
βt[(nt + ht)z − θt(1− nt)κ
α
+
1− α
α
(1− γ)htSt]− n0κ
αq(θ0)
+
1− α
α
(1− γ)n0S0.

Proof of Proposition 1 The union objective can be written in terms of the planner’s value
function, as in equation (10). The planner problem is standard, and known to have a linear
solution V (n), with the planner’s choice of θ constant, independent of n. The union objective
differs in the initial period by the −n0κ/q(θ0) term, however, which implies that the initial
θ0 is below the planner’s choice, and this difference is greater the greater is n0. 
Proof of Proposition 2 Consider a steady state of the unionized economy, where Θ′(n) =
−c for some c > 0. Using this fact, steady-state employment can be written as n = (1 −
δ)µ(θ)/(1 − (1 − δ)(1 − µ(θ))), equation (16) implies that the steady-state θ satisfies the
equation
1 = µ′(θ)
z − b
κ
+ β(1− δ)(1− µ(θ) + θµ′(θ))−∆(θ), (30)
where ∆(θ) ≡ 0 in the efficient outcome, and
∆(θ) ≡ −1− δ
δ
µ(θ)
q′(θ)
q(θ)2
[1− β(1− δ)(1− µ(θ)− µ
′(θ)δc
1− (1− δ)(1− µ(θ)))]
in the unionized economy. The term ∆(θ) thus captures the union distortion. Under effi-
ciency, the right-hand side of equation (30) is strictly decreasing in θ pinning down a unique
steady-state θ (as long as µ′(0) z−b
κ
+ β(1 − δ) > 1).28 Because the union distortion ∆(θ) is
strictly positive for any θ > 0, the unionized economy must have lower steady-state θ. 
Proof of Proposition 3 Similarly to Proposition 1, this result follows from writing the
union problem in terms of the planner’s value function, as in the text. 
28Note that mu(v, u) = µ(θ)− µ′(θ)θ, an expression which is reasonable to assume to be increasing in θ.
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B Bellman equations for extended model
The Bellman equations for the non-union workers in the extended model can be written as
follows. For the value of unemployment and employment we have
Ut = µ(θt)Et + (1− µ(θt))(b+ βUt+1),
Et = wt + βδUt+1 + β(1− δ)Et+1,
where Ut is the value of an unemployed worker, Et the value of an employed worker, and wt
the wage of a non-union worker. Recall that the union status of a worker is fixed over time.
For the value of a job filled with a non-union worker we have
Jt = z − wt + β(1− δ)Jt+1.
Defining the match surplus as St ≡ Et+ Jt− b− βUt+1, and requiring that the private wage
bargains divide the surplus according to Jt = (1−γ)St, and Et− b−βUt+1 = γSt, the match
surplus can be shown to satisfy equation (20) in the text.
C Numerical approach
As discussed in Section 4.2, we adopt the solution method outlined in Krusell, Kuruscu, and
Smith (2002) for the generalized Euler equation. Given the complexity of the system (23)-
(27), we begin by describing the approach in the context of equation (16), before proceeding
to the extended model.
The generalized Euler equation (16) is a functional equation in Θ(n), defined over a range
of values of n encompassing the steady state. The idea is to calculate a Taylor polynomial
approximating Θ(n) around its steady state. Calculating a kth order polynomial involves
first analytically differentiating the Euler equation k times with respect to n, acknowledging
that Θ(n) and N(n,Θ(n)) are functions of n. We then evaluate the resulting system of
k + 1 equations in steady state, setting Θ and its derivatives to their steady-state values
θ, θ′, ..., θk+1, as well as replacing n with its steady-state value µ(θ)(1− δ)/(δ+ µ(θ)(1− δ)).
This yields a system of k + 1 equations in the unknowns θ, θ′, ..., θk+1. We then set θk+1 to
zero, to arrive at a system of k + 1 equations in k + 1 unknowns—the coefficients of the
polynomial approximating Θ(n).
We implement this approach in two stages. The first stage involves using an analytical
solver, like Mathematica, to calculate the analytical derivatives and perform the substitutions
needed to arrive at the system of equations in θ, θ′, ..., θk. The second stage involves using a
numerical solver, like Matlab, to solve this non-linear system of equations. Solving the system
can, in practice, require a good initial guess, so we approach the problem iteratively. We start
with a 0th order Taylor polynomial and proceed to successively higher-order polynomials
using the results from the previous step as initial guesses, looking for convergence in the
coefficients of the polynomial as we proceed.
Turning to the extended model, then, we apply the same approach directly to the system
(23)-(27). Instead of taking derivatives of an Euler equation, we take derivatives of the first
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order condition of the union objective in equation (25). These derivatives will involve the
values and derivatives of the functions V f (n, θ), V r(n), Sf(n, θ), Sr(n) as well, since they were
not eliminated from the first order condition in deriving an Euler equation. We therefore
need to calculate these values and derivatives in a separate step, in order to incorporate
them into the equations.
Again, we implement the solution approach in two stages. In the analytical derivation stage,
we tackle the system (23)-(27) starting from the surplus equations (23)-(24), then the value
equations (26)-(27), and finally the first order condition for equation (25).
Beginning with the system (23)-(24): To solve for the steady-state levels of surpluses Sf (n, θ), Sr(n),
we simply solve the system analytically, expressing the steady-state levels of Sf(n, θ), Sr(n)
as functions of steady-state θ. To solve for first derivatives of Sf(n, θ), Sr(n), we differentiate
the system (23)-(24) with respect to (n, θ) (acknowledging that the recontracting tightness
Θ(n) andN(n,Θ(n)) are functions of n), evaluate the resulting equations at steady state, and
solve the resulting system for steady-state values of the derivatives Sfn(n, θ), S
f
θ (n, θ), S
r
n(n)
as functions of the steady-state values and derivatives of Θ(n) and values of Sf(n, θ), Sr(n).
To solve for higher order derivatives of Sf (θ, n), Sr(n), proceed along the same lines. The
equations allow analytical solutions in each step.
We then turn to system (26)-(27), and proceed with the same approach to arrive at expres-
sions for the steady-state values and derivatives of V f (n, θ), V r(n) as functions of the steady-
state values and derivatives of Θ(n), values and (lower order) derivatives of V f (n, θ), V r(n),
as well as values and derivatives of Sf(n, θ), Sr(n). Again, these equations allow analytical
solutions in each step.
Finally, we turn to the first order condition for equation (25), proceeding to differentiate the
equation k times, and evaluate the resulting equations in steady state. This yields k + 1
equations in the steady-state value and derivatives of Θ(n), which depend also on those of
Sf(n, θ), V f (n, θ), V r(n). To eliminate the latter from the equations, we use the expressions
derived above. This yields k + 1 equations representing the 0th − kth derivatives of the first
order condition for equation (25) in the unknowns θ, θ′, ..., θk+1. We then set θk+1 to zero, to
arrive at a system of k + 1 equations in k + 1 unknowns—the coefficients of the polynomial
approximating Θ(n).
In the numerical stage, we solve this non-linear system of equations. In practice, solving the
system can require a good initial guess, so we approach the problem iteratively. We start
with a 0th order Taylor polynomial and proceed to successively higher-order polynomials
using the results from the previous step as initial guesses, looking for convergence in the
coefficients of the polynomial as we proceed.
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